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ABSTRACT
Although oﬀenses against international law have been proscribed
at a certain level of generality, nobody hitherto has examined
closely the scientiﬁc and ecological damages that would be
imposed by nuclear strikes in relation to resulting possible law-of-
war violations. To correct that information deﬁcit and institutional
shortfall, the ﬁrst Part of this Article constructs a hortatory propo-
sal for a tribunal for the use of nuclear weapons under interna-
tional law. The second Part of the Article shows how such
a tribunal statute would have a real-world eﬀect on those charged
with launching nuclear strikes and determining the legality of the
strike orders. For the ﬁrst time, through a series of interviews and
electronic communications, we have gathered empirical and anec-
dotal information regarding the actual processes of launch instruc-
tions to lower level crewmembers and, in particular, those who
refused the order – or “refuseniks”. What emerges from these
accounts is the startling reality that low-level crewmembers had
little or no guidance on the legality of the strike under the laws of
war but were told simply to trust their leadership. A tribunal
statute geared speciﬁcally to the use of nuclear weapons would
provide needed guidance and constitute solid legal grounds upon
which to stand should those lower down in the chain of command
ﬁnd the order to launch a nuclear strike manifestly illegal under
international law.
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International law makes crystal clear that states1 and individuals2 are accountable for
their actions and, moreover, that states may establish international institutions and
governance structures designed to hold accountable in fact those who violate the law.3
Yet a massive institutional shortfall and information deﬁcit exists in the accountability
of states and individuals when it comes to nuclear threats and strikes.
This two-part Article seeks to correct that shortfall and information deﬁcit. Although
oﬀenses against international law have been proscribed at a certain level of generality,
nobody to date has dug deeply into the doctrinal, scientiﬁc and ecological weeds of
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1Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, [2001] Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n
26, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) at art. 1 (hereinafter “Draft Articles”).
2Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 105 (hereinafter “ICC Statute”).
3Id. at art. 1; Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Charter of
the International Military Tribunal art. 1, 8 August 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1544.
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what a nuclear strike in particular would actually look like regarding the vast humani-
tarian and environmental damage as it relates to law-of-war violations the strike might
generate. We not only ﬁll this gap by elaborating at a more speciﬁc level extant crimes
as they relate to the use of nuclear weapons within the ambit of existing international
law, but also seek to add new oﬀenses like ecocide to the list of internationally
proscribed oﬀenses as they relate to the use of nuclear weapons. We then describe
how a tribunal statute might inﬂuence those in the chain of command charged with
determining the legality or illegality of a nuclear strike.
The Article contains both normative and descriptive components. Part I begins by
describing the urgent need for an international accountability mechanism speciﬁcally
tailored to nuclear weapons and the promises of collective action instruments like
Security Council Resolution 984 (Resolution 984)4 and the incipient Treaty for the
Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).5 These instruments contain pioneering provi-
sions we call “universality provisions”, indicating universal jurisdiction by all states over
certain crimes relating to the use of nuclear weapons. The provisions provide that states
parties must coax non-state parties to join the instruments “with the goal of universal
adherence” (art. 12). And they explicitly acknowledge the sui generis externalities posed by
the threat and use of nuclear weapons, the eﬀects of which “transcend national borders”
and imperil humankind through a variety of catastrophic means (para. 4).
The Article then imagines an innovative tribunal, or International Tribunal for the Use
of Nuclear Weapons (ITNW), to ﬁll yawning gaps related to nuclear threats and ﬁrst-use
strikes, or collectively “nuclear aggression”, as well as subsequent war crimes, crimes against
humanity and crimes against the environment – i.e., ecocide. The tribunal statute, the
Article argues, should contain more chiseled deﬁnitions of crimes in what we will call
a “nuclear weapons clause”. This clause may be added to existing international oﬀense
deﬁnitions. In this respect, we lean largely on the deﬁnitions laid out in the Rome Statute for
the International Criminal Court (ICC).6 Drawing from the Article’s forerunner, The Duty
to Disobey Illegal Nuclear Strike Orders (Colangelo 2018, 84), and speciﬁcally the quantita-
tively and qualitatively unique nature of nuclear weapons, the clause would provide:
Where conventional weapons can be used to achieve the same military objective as nuclear
weapons in proximity to civilians, and nuclear weapons are used instead, that use or threat
of use constitute oﬀenses laid out in this article.7
In the course of this discussion, the Article explains how the clause would aﬀect law-of-
war calculi in practice.
Part II then explains how this tribunal can also equip those down the chain of
command charged with launching nuclear weapons with both necessary and clearer
information about the strike so as to determine its legality. To be sure, the passing along
of this information is a legal obligation formally imposed on high-ups in the chain of
4S.C. Res. 984 (11 April 1995).
5Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons art. 12, 7 July 2017, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/
2017/07/20170707%2003-42%20PM/Ch_XXVI_9.pdf (hereinafter “TPNW”).
6See ICC Statute, supra note 2 at arts. 5–10.
7One could similarly argue that where a certain type of nuclear strike strategy would produce less civilian death and
suﬀering than another type of nuclear strike strategy, but would achieve the same military objective, the former must
be favored. For an example of this type of thinking, see Rosenbaum (2011, 239). (recounting Admiral Burke’s view
that a submarine-based missile defense strategy would produce less civilian death and suﬀering than a land-based
missile defense strategy).
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command (Kehler 2016, 55) – yet one that is too often heeded in theory but in not
practice.8 Hence the tribunal will serve as both a deterrent and solid legal grounds to
stand on for persons within the nuclear chain of command because they will know
about the consequences of following an illegal strike order. At present, such personnel
usually are not told and thus do not know what an illegal strike order is (Kehler 2016).
That is, troublingly speaking, many individuals in nuclear command hierarchies are
not provided with the necessary information to determine if certain strikes comply with
international law. Rather, they are told to trust their leadership and its review of the
legality of orders, and they have nowhere to go for advice, rulings, or sanctuary if they
elect to disobey the order based on a reasonable presumption that a nuclear strike
constitutes a manifestly illegal act of aggression or exceeds the law regarding war
crimes, crimes against humanity and ecocide.9
To make the case in the second Part of the Article we employ empirical and
anecdotal precedents collected from individuals through interviews and electronic
communications who, in the past, have rejected nuclear strike orders. We evaluate
these individuals’ treatment under domestic and international law to cast insight on
accountability structures as well as the continuing relevance of the duty to disobey
illegal nuclear strike orders today. This empirical and anecdotal evidence throws into
sharp relief what it means to refuse to carry out illegal orders up to the present day and
the need for a tribunal statute to provide grounds to stand on should an order be passed
down that manifestly violates the law.
* * *
To be clear from the outset, the Article is primarily a normative project – but one we
hope may stimulate thinking regarding real-world responses to the renascent rhetoric
and actions suggesting that a nuclear strike or threat of strike may be a growing
possibility. Yet legally speaking, the normative proposal is not necessarily a farfetched
pie in the sky. International law permits all states to exercise universal jurisdiction over
serious crimes of international law like those proscribed by the ICC statute (Colangelo
2006, 149). And what one state may do on its own, multiple states may do together.
Thus, the collective action of states parties to the TPNW may well create the type of
tribunal this Article imagines. For its existence may serve as a clarifying agent for the
law, a deterrent agent for those who seek to break the law and, in its most mature form,
a punitive agent for those who in fact do break the law and a compensatory agent for
those who suﬀer from that international law violation.
Yet the objection immediately will be made that since there have been no nuclear
strikes since World War II, what purpose would a tribunal serve in terms of actual
prosecutions? There are at least three responses. One answer, of course, is that the
threat or use of nuclear weapons is prohibited, and the tribunal would have occasion to
ﬂesh out the contours of what does and does not constitute a threat. Another answer is
8“In many (perhaps most) cases, nuclear crews will not know the speciﬁcs of the target they are being ordered to strike”
(Kehler 2016, 55). British nuclear submarine commanders, for example, appear to not know the target coordinates for
their nuclear missiles, yet they would be accountable for such strikes if they are manifestly illegal (UK Public
Administration and Aﬀairs Committee, 2019).
9According to both international and domestic law, for there to be a violation “the order must be ‘manifestly unlawful’
or constitute ‘clearly illegal orders to commit violations’” of international law (Colangelo 2018, 91).
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that an international tribunal – like the ICJ – may issue advisory opinions should states
contemplate the use of nuclear weapons but want to know the legality of that use
beforehand. A third and more fundamental answer is that it is better to have an
adjudicative body set up prospectively rather than retrospectively for all sorts of
reasons, primary among them being notice of the applicable law and the forum in
which one may be held accountable. To be sure, the major (and not unpersuasive)
objection the Nazis made at Nuremberg was that the tribunal and the law being applied
to them were retroactive.10 The Nuremberg tribunal ended up having to fudge on this
point by holding that anyone would know the acts the Nazis engaged in were
criminal,11 but from a positivistic view – the reigning jurisprudential lens through
which we view law today as a human construct – this holding was highly problematic.
The ex ante establishment of an adjudicatory institution with clearly promulgated rules
eﬀectively erases that objection.
Part I: A Hortatory Proposal
The Need for an Institutional Accountability Mechanism
Existing international accountability mechanisms are hobbled in various ways. As to
state responsibility, the International Court of Justice’s jurisdiction depends on states’
consent that the Court hears the case.12 As to individual responsibility, the ICC has
limited jurisdiction: its jurisdiction extends only over acts occurring in a state party’s
territory or by a national of a state party; and not all states are parties to the ICC,
especially major nuclear powers and states most likely to be victims of a nuclear strike.13
The Court may only reach beyond these precincts if the case is referred by the United
Nations Security Council – something that is unlikely if not outright impossible since
certain permanent members of the Council will invariably veto the Court’s jurisdiction
given their allergy to the court someday asserting jurisdiction over their own nationals
should the permanent members themselves pursue the use of nuclear weapons at
present or in the future.14 Perhaps the last bastion of hope resides in the decentralized
enforcement of international law by states through the controversial doctrine of uni-
versal jurisdiction, or the principle that every state has jurisdiction over certain espe-
cially heinous oﬀenses against international law.15 But this too has its pitfalls or at least
shortcomings since it often fails to provide the harmonized deﬁnitional and deterrent
heft of a truly international accountability mechanism.
Such deﬁnitional and deterrent heft in the form of an international tribunal statute
may not only inﬂuence states but also may help resolve serious dilemmas for
10United States v. Hermann Goering, 22 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 411,
444 (1948).
11Id.
12Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 32, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
13ICC Statute, supra note 2, at art. 12.
14Nemo judex in parte sua – one cannot be the judge of a case in which he has an interest. Nemo judex in parte sua,
DUHAIME’S LAW DICTIONARY available at http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/N/NemoJudexInParteSua.aspx. For
a recent and concrete example see U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton’s remarks denouncing the ICC due
to the Court considering prosecuting U.S. servicemen over alleged detainee abuse in Afghanistan. BBC, John Bolton
threatens ICC with US sanctions, (18 September 2018)
15“Universal jurisdiction instead is based entirely on the commission of certain ‘universal crimes’ . . . [which] all states
have jurisdiction to prosecute” (Colangelo 2006, 150–51).
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individuals ordered to launch a nuclear strike by providing clear legal guidance on what
constitutes nuclear aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ecocide. In
particular, those lower in the command chain who may or may not have full informa-
tion regarding a nuclear strike will have stronger legal grounds to resist the order unless
given speciﬁc information regarding the strike. The overarching eﬀect would thus be
not only to overcome wide gaps and close loopholes in existing legal accountability
structures but also to have a potent deterrent eﬀect on the illegal use of nuclear weapons
by decision makers and individuals in nuclear command hierarchies based on clear,
harmonized deﬁnitions. For these individuals have a duty under the law to resist
“manifestly illegal” orders16 – and orders to commit crimes such as aggression,17 war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and, the Article argues, ecocide, would qualify.
Like Nuremberg, we seek to ground the existence of just such a tribunal in the all-
encompassing customary law of universal jurisdiction alluded to above; but also to
centralize and codify it in a tribunal statute that may eﬀectively and clearly lay out
oﬀense deﬁnitions instead of relying on individual (and perhaps idiosyncratic) exercises
of universal jurisdiction by states.
The Promises of Resolution 984 and the TPNW
There is a growing body of international law relating to the use of nuclear weapons. U.
N. Security Council Resolution 984 condemns the aggressive use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states by nuclear weapons states; pro-
mises, at the request of a victim, technical, medical, scientiﬁc or humanitarian assis-
tance, and aﬃrms readiness to implement measures needed in the event of an act of
aggression; compensates non-nuclear states for damages resulting from “loss, damage
or injury sustained as a result of the aggression”; and, further promises assistance to the
victim state.18
The TPNW similarly and eponymously contains a number of provisions banning the
use of nuclear weapons. Article I prohibits the development and transfer or receipt of
nuclear weapons, the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and “allow[ing] any
stationing, installation or deployment of nuclear weapons”. Further, Article 5 provides
for national implementation of legislation, and Article 6 requires environmental reme-
diation as a result of activities “related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons”.
Finally, Article 12 contains a “universality provision” – an innovative provision that
states parties have an obligation to seek universal adherence to the treaty. Speciﬁcally,
“Each State Party shall encourage States not party to the [. . .] Treaty [to enter into the
Treaty], with the goal of universal adherence” by all states. It thus explicitly reaches out
beyond the states parties to the treaty in an attempt to coax compliance with the treaty
by all states uniquely and powerfully indicating a species of universal jurisdiction
indicated by the treaty. Indeed, the treaty’s introduction acknowledges the externalities
16“Manifestly illegal” orders would include, inter alia, an order to ﬁre upon the shipwrecked, kill defenseless persons
who have submitted to physical control, and kill innocent civilians (Colangelo 2018, 92).
17Like other humanitarian oﬀenses – i.e., war crimes, aggression also has a “manifestly illegal” requirement.
Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression, para. 2,
6 November 2010, 2922 U.N.T.S. 9.
18S.C. Res. 948, para. 6 (11 April 1995).
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caused by the use of nuclear weapons, providing that the “catastrophic consequences of
nuclear weapons . . . transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human
survival, the environment, socioeconomic development, the global economy, food
security, and the health of future of current and future generations” (art. 1).
A tribunal with jurisdiction over all actors in a nuclear chain of command would
constitute a persuasive way to make these promises a reality. All of this comports with
Resolution 984 since it seeks universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (art. 12) just like the TPNW.
At this point the reader might object that the instruments themselves do not formally
establish universal jurisdiction. That is to say, they apply only to states parties. But that
is not our contention. It is true that as a matter of positive law these instruments apply
only to states parties. But universal jurisdiction is a matter of customary, not positive,
international law (there is no such thing as universal jurisdiction by treaty). And the
instruments’ universality provisions provide the very best evidence we have of the dual
components of customary international law: state practice and opinio juris. To reject
this view of how universal jurisdiction is formed is to reject universal jurisdiction over
virtually all universal jurisdiction oﬀenses today.
Oﬀenses within the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
This section lays out the proposed oﬀenses within the subject matter jurisdiction of the
tribunal: aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ecocide. It deﬁnes these
crimes by drawing in part from the established deﬁnitions in the ICC statute and other
international instruments, like the U.N. Charter, and adds the Nuclear Weapons Clause.
It also justiﬁes that addition in light of the unique nature of nuclear weapons and
explains how that addition would work in practice. The unique characteristics of
nuclear weapons were succinctly put in the Duty to Disobey Illegal Nuclear Strike
Orders, and are reproduced below:
First, quantitatively, the blast power, heat, and energy generated far outstrip that of
conventional weapons, likely rendering nuclear weapons indiscriminate. Second, qualita-
tively, the radiation released is so powerful that it damages DNA and causes death and
severe health defects throughout the entire lives of survivors as well as their children.
Third, nuclear weapons make virtually impossible humanitarian assistance to survivors at
the blast scene struggling to survive, leading to more suﬀering and death. Fourth, damage
to the environment may produce not only devastating environmental harm itself but also
widespread famine and starvation. Fifth, nuclear weapons cause long-lasting multi-
generational psychological injury to survivors of the blast. (Colangelo 2018, 101)
Aggression
At the present moment, perhaps the most immediate violation of international law
occupying the world’s population when it comes to the use of nuclear weapons is the
crime of aggression. As with other oﬀenses, here we borrow the newly activated
deﬁnition of the crime as set forth in the treaty for the ICC as a starting point,19 and
19Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression, para. 2,
6 November 2010, 2922 U.N.T.S. 9.
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key provisions of the United Nations Charter. And in this regard, perhaps of most
immediate importance regarding the deﬁnition of the crime is the ICC prohibition on
the planning and preparation of a nuclear strike20 as well as the U.N. Charter’s –
incorporated by reference into the ICC statute21 – prohibition on the “the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”.22
The ICC statute deﬁnes aggression as “the planning, preparation, initiation or
execution by a person in a position eﬀectively to exercise control over or to direct the
political military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character,
gravity, and scale constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations”.23
An act of aggression, in turn, is deﬁned by the ICC statute as “the use of armed force by
a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”.24
Among crimes of aggression are “[b]ombardment . . . against . . . territory” and “use of
any weapons . . . against . . . territory”.25 This deﬁnition plainly includes the use of
nuclear weapons, especially by a ﬁrst-strike state, as well as the “planning [and]
preparation” of that strike and “the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state”.26
This latter aspect of the deﬁnition has not received targeted attention by ICC
jurisprudence due to the recent activation of the crime, but the plain language indicates
that planning and preparation constitute a separable oﬀense due to the disjunctive
deﬁnition: again, it prohibits “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution” of an
illegal act of aggression.27 Hence those all the way up the chain of command who have
a hand in determining the legality of an aggressive nuclear strike explicitly can be held
liable under international law.28 In the United States, this would include not only
STRATCOM and related bodies like combatant commands (CCMDs), along with the
civilian chain of command, which develop options for the president should he con-
template any order ranging from a nuclear strike to those made in emergency situa-
tions, but also the president himself – the only person capable of “initiat[ing] a nuclear
strike” (Kehler 2016, 55). It would similarly include the entire chain of command under
other countries’ planning and preparation mechanisms.
Moreover, according to the plain language of the U.N. Charter, the mere threat of
use of nuclear weapons also constitutes a separable oﬀense – again, Article 2(4) states
that “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state” constitutes a violation of the Charter. This is consonant with the
20Id.
21Id. at art. 8 bis 2. (“For the purpose of paragraph 1, ‘act of aggression’ means the use of armed force by a state against
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Charter of the United Nations”) (emphasis added).
22Charter of the United Nations art. 2(4) (emphasis added).
23Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression, 6 November 2010,
2922 U.N.T.S. 9. at para. 2.
24Id.
25Id.
26See Charter of the United Nations art. 2(4); Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on
the Crime of Aggression, art. 8 bis. 2, 6 November 2010, 2922 U.N.T.S. 9.
27Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression, art. 8,
6 November 2010, 2922 U.N.T.S. 9 (emphasis added).
28According to international law since Nuremberg, those up the chain of command would be liable – but aggression
sets that out expressly. See Colangelo (2018, 115–16).
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International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), which states:
Whether [a] ‘threat’ [is] contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4 depends upon whether the
particular use of force envisaged would be directed against the territorial integrity or
political independence of a State, or against the [p]urposes of the United Nations [or] . . . it
would necessarily violate the principles of necessity and proportionality.29
Thus the ICJ treats threats as a separable oﬀense from the actual use of force, and it ties
the manner of the threat into humanitarian law – or the law of how war is conducted –
into law of war principles of necessity and proportionality, to be discussed below in
more detail.30 For present purposes, it is enough to say that necessity and proportion-
ality exhibit a synergistic relationship such that if a threat is disproportionate it is
militarily unnecessary.
This synergy factors directly into the Nuclear Weapons Clause:
Where conventional weapons can be used to achieve the same military objective as nuclear
weapons in proximity to civilians, and nuclear weapons are used instead, that use and
threat of use constitute oﬀenses laid out in this article.
The Clause thus invites comparative analysis of nuclear versus conventional weapons
throughout the chain of command at each point of planning and preparation of the
attack, developing options and packages, and threatening the use of nuclear weapons to
ensure the contemplated strike is proportionate and necessary.
Furthermore, while it is true that either use of weaponry could constitute aggression, state
practice has shown that use of conventional weaponry against the territorial integrity of other
nations does not always yield actionable claimsof aggression. This is especially so in the ﬁeld of
humanitarian intervention. As Harold Koh explains, “state practice oﬀers prominent [. . .]
examples of de facto humanitarian intervention: India–Bangladesh, Tanzania–Uganda,
Vietnam–Cambodia (Khmer Rouge), theUnited States and theUnitedKingdom creating no-
ﬂy zones over Iraq to protect the Kurds and the Shias, and of course, NATO’s famous Kosovo
episode of the late Twentieth Century” (Koh 2017, 288).31
As to the latter extremely prominent example, the bombing of Kosovo to halt an ongoing
genocide can be justiﬁed under another provision of the U.N. Charter, namely the very ﬁrst
provision: Article 1, which obligates states to “promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human
rights” (art. 1(3)). For this reason, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo
29Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at paras. 48, 75.
30See infra, Part IV.B.ii-iii.
31Professor Koh has advocated for a particular test to determine the legality of an instance of humanitarian interven-
tion: ﬁrst, the intervention must be prompted by a “humanitarian crisis creat[ing] consequences signiﬁcantly
disruptive of international order” (Koh 2019, 137). Second, the intervening nations must seek U.N. approval, and
ﬁnd it “not available because of persistent veto” (Koh 2019, 132). Third, and most important for the purposes of this
Article, only “limited force” that is “necessary and proportionate to address the imminent threat” would be permitted
under Koh’s test (emphasis added) (Koh 2019, 132). (Koh goes on to give a variety of other elements that must be
met for an intervention to be legal under developing international law, however, for the purposes of this Article, the
requirement of proportionality is of singular importance). In the nuclear context, this proposed test cannot be
satisﬁed. As will be made clear below (see, e.g. Part I.B.ii, infra), given the unique short-term and long-term
destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons, a strike from a nuclear weapon would never be proportionate. See
Colangelo 2018, 91) (describing the unique destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons.) At least under the Koh test,
then, the use of nuclear weapons in humanitarian intervention clearly runs afoul of the Nuclear Weapons Clause;
because other, more conventional, means can be used to prevent ongoing humanitarian crises, the use of nuclear
weapons is not proportionate and constitutes an oﬀense under international law.
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called the intervention “illegal but legitimate” and “justiﬁed” (Independent International
Commission on Kosovo 2000, 4). To take a more recent example, “[w]hen all the world
seems already to have intervened in Syria, it is a ﬁction to assert an absolutist norm against
intervention as a prevailing governing norm” (Koh 2019, 137).
Where the Nuclear Weapons Clause comes into play is in the relative destructive and
indiscriminate nature of the weapons used. Because, as the next section explains,
nuclear weapons are far more likely to be indiscriminate, disproportionate, militarily
unnecessary, and to cause unnecessary suﬀering and superﬂuous injury under the law
of war, their use would exceed the potentially limited allowance international law makes
for humanitarian intervention, which includes – necessarily – a proportionality require-
ment (if the rationale for intervention is the protection of human life but one form of
intervention would cause more loss of life and suﬀering than another form of inter-
vention, the former intervention is ultra vires).
Indeed, nuclear weapons are far more likely to cause a humanitarian crisis than to
alleviate one due to their massive and unpredictable destructive nature stemming from
the immense blast yield, release of ionizing radiation, environmental catastrophe
caused, and prevention of humanitarian assistance at the blast scene. Should members
of the chain of command fail to engage the comparative analysis insisted upon by the
Nuclear Weapons Clause as regards the more limited destructive power of conventional
weapons, such personnel could be liable for aggression or threats thereof, and could not
justiﬁably hide behind the rationale of humanitarian intervention.
War Crimes
Two diﬀerent but related bodies of law cover the legality of a nuclear strike. There is
a diﬀerence between the law of going to war (jus ad bellum) and the humanitarian law of
how one conducts war (jus in bello) (Sloane 2009, 47). While the crime of aggression may fall
into both the jus ad bellum and jus in bello categories, the law covering war crimes is
principally concerned with jus in bello – how hostilities are conducted – because that is the
realm in which an illegal strike order would be handed down. As Colangelo (2018)32 fairly set
forth, war crimes include a number of principles that, if violated, constitute crimes against
international humanitarian law. The case was ﬁrst made there that if conventional weapons
can be used to achieve the samemilitary objectives as nuclearweapons, and the nuclear option
is used instead of the conventional option, the result would be war crimes due to the unique
destructive power of nuclear weapons. (Colangelo 2018). We thus lean on that analysis here.
According to the ICC Statute, war crimes constitute a long list of acts that violate the
laws of war (art. 8(2)). Permeating this list are certain core principles as set forth in the
Geneva Conventions and customary international law, namely: distinction, proportion-
ality, necessity, and the prevention of unnecessary suﬀering and superﬂuous injury.
These principles constitute the meat of this section.33
32“Four fundamental principles govern international humanitarian law: distinction between combatants and civilians,
proportionality, military necessity, and the prevention of unnecessary suﬀering . . .. [A]ny serious violation of [these
principles] is considered a war crime” (Colangelo 2018, 101).
33More discrete crimes do not fall within the Article’s purview, for example, “Unlawful deportation or transfer or
unlawful conﬁnement”, Id. at art. 8(2)(vii). Rather, we are concerned with broader crimes like “[i]ntentionally
launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated”, Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
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(i) Distinction
First is the principle of distinction or protection of civilians not taking part in
hostilities, which is in many ways the wellspring of all humanitarian law principles.
An accepted formulation is found in Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions,
which embody customary international law34
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects,
the Parties to the conﬂict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian objects and
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives.35
Because nuclear weapons have a greater blast yield and release massive amounts of
ionizing radiation, target discrimination becomes exponentially harder than when
a conventional weapon is used.
(ii) Proportionality
Next is the principle of proportionality, which appears in a number of places in
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Article 51(5)(b) prohibits: “[A]n
attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”.
Article 57(2)(a)(iii) and (b) eﬀectively repeat this language. And, according to
Article 57(2)(a)(ii):
[W]ith respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: those who plan or
decide upon an attack shall: take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.
Thus an attack – even an attack that is anticipated to achieve a concrete and direct
military advantage – cannot disproportionately kill or injure civilians. Instead, both
the anticipated military advantage and the loss of civilian life must be calculated
prior to the attack. In this sense, and as the language makes plain, there is
a foreseeability criterion built into the proportionality standard.36 Because nuclear
weapons are far more catastrophic and produce vast unforeseen consequences on
civilian life, the environment, food supply, etc., conventional weapons promise to be
more protective of civilian life.
34See Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at paras. 41, 75.:
35Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conﬂicts art. 48, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17,512 (hereinafter “Additional Protocol I”). Similarly,
Article 51(2) provides: “The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.
Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are
prohibited”. Id. at art. 51(2). And Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005) explain:
36There may be a retroactivity problem if, at the stage of planning, the strike looks legal but unforeseeable
consequences due to the shifting of circumstances renders the strike illegal when executed. In such a situation,
“what is reasonable under the circumstances” should mean what is reasonable under the circumstances during the
time the strike was planned; not an ex post evaluation of the legality in light of changed circumstances.
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(iii) Necessity
The principle of necessity holds that “no act of violence can be used that does not
contribute to overcoming the enemy, whereas any act that helps overcome the enemy is
permissible unless other jus in bello principles prohibit it” (Luban, O’Sullivan, and
Stewart 2010, 1040–41). Thus, there must be a military necessity motivating the nuclear
strike, but any strike must obey other jus in bello principles like distinction and
proportionality. In turn, there is a certain synergy among the various principles to
form a law of war web ensuring that actions taken protect civilian life to the most
realistic extent possible – a synergy that incorporates other principles such as distinc-
tion and proportionality. Because use of nuclear weapons as compared to conventional
weapons violates these other law of war principles, their use also violates the necessity
principle.
(iv) Prevention on Unnecessary Suﬀering and Superﬂuous Injury
According to the Geneva Conventions, the prevention of unnecessary suﬀering and
superﬂuous injury provides: “It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and
material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superﬂuous injury or unnecessary
suﬀering” (Additional Protocol I, art. 35 (2)). This is not an all-out prohibition on
causing death or injuries, both of which international humanitarian law recognizes will
occur in armed conﬂict. Rather, it is a prohibition on causing unnecessary death and
injuries through the choice and use of materials and methods of military action. If the
choice includes nuclear as opposed to conventional weapons that can achieve the same
military objective, the ionizing radiation released by nuclear weapons not only would
cause far more suﬀering and injury but also would make virtually impossible humani-
tarian assistance to those at the blast scene.
In sum, Colangelo (2018) fairly set forth the argument that anytime a nuclear strike
is used in proximity to a civilian population instead of a conventional strike, the nuclear
strike would virtually always cause more death and suﬀering, resulting in war crimes.
Crimes Against Humanity
The ICC statute deﬁnes crimes against humanity as any of a variety of crimes including,
inter alia, murder, extermination and “other inhumane acts . . . causing great
suﬀering”37 when committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”. This deﬁnition encom-
passes three major requirements: First, it requires the commission of a predicate crime
such as murder or extermination. Second, it requires the commission of the predicate
crime in furtherance of a widespread or systematic attack. Finally, the actor must have
knowledge that his act or acts form part of the widespread or systematic attack.
37The statute further provides that enslavement, deportation, torture, imprisonment, rape, sexual slavery, forced
prostitution, apartheid, and persecution are predicate crimes for a charge of crimes against humanity. The three
listed above, murder, extermination, and inhumane acts causing great suﬀering are of principle interest in the
discussion of nuclear weapons, and therefore of principle interest in this Article. ICC Statute, supra note 2 at art. 7.
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The ﬁrst requirement is plainly satisﬁed by the use of nuclear weapons; the use of
a nuclear weapon against another state will necessarily entail “inhumane acts . . . causing
great suﬀering”, murder and (perhaps) extermination (art. 7).
The second requirement requests further deﬁnitional speciﬁcity of the terms “wide-
spread” and “systematic”. Importantly, these terms are disjunctive: the statute requires
only that a crime against humanity be widespread or systematic – it is not necessary
that a predicate crime be both.38 ICC precedent in turn makes clear that “‘widespread’
averts to the large-scale nature of the attack and to the number of targeted persons”.39
An attack is systematic when it is planned, organized and is part of a “‘pattern of
crimes’ reﬂected in the non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on
a regular basis”.40
A nuclear strike in proximity to a civilian center, by its very nature, would be
widespread for the purposes of the ICC Statute. As discussed above, the destructive
force of nuclear weapons is massive, capable of causing huge numbers of civilian deaths
in a single instant. This widespread quality is suﬃcient to bring the use of nuclear
weapons within the ambit of crimes against humanity. The systematic requirements are
trickier, and may or may not be met by the use of a nuclear strike. A single nuclear
strike would necessarily be planned and organized (with the hopefully improbable
exception, perhaps, of an accidental nuclear strike). However, the requirement that an
attack be part of an intentionally repeated pattern of similar crimes may be problematic
in the nuclear context, at least in the abstract. A single state actor committing a single
nuclear strike cannot fairly be said to be part of such a pattern. As such, when a state
commits only a single nuclear crime, it may not be “systematic”. This observation
should be tempered by reality, however. The likelihood of retributive strikes, should one
state actor launch a nuclear assault on another, is immense. A retributive strike or series
of strikes may be suﬃcient to establish the requisite pattern.41 Moreover, it is unlikely
that a state, having made the grave decision to employ nuclear weapons in the ﬁrst
place, would limit itself to using one single weapon. However, even if it were the case
that a given nuclear strike were inarguably non-systematic, this would not take the
strike outside the deﬁnition of crimes against humanity. Recall that such a crime must
only be either widespread or systematic.
Finally, the knowledge requirement is satisﬁed when an actor has knowledge that his
or her action contributes to the widespread or systematic attack.42 The actors’ motive is
not relevant; all that is necessary is that the actor knew that his or her action formed
part of the attack.43 Again, this echoes a theme established in Colangelo (Colangelo
2018)44 The actor in the nuclear chain-of-command cannot insulate himself from
responsibility merely because he was “following orders”. In other words, without any
38Id.; See also Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04–01/07–3436-AnxI, Judgment pursuant to art. 74 of the Statute, para.
1123 (7 March 2014).
39Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04–01/07–3436-AnxI, Judgment pursuant to art. 74 of the Statute, para. 1123
(7 March 2014).
40Id.
41It is unclear from existing authority whether the pattern of crimes must all be committed by the same actor, or if it is
suﬃcient for an actor to act as a part of an existing pattern involving multiple crimes committed by diﬀerent actors.
42Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04–01/07–3436-AnxI, Judgment pursuant to art. 74 of the Statute, para. 1123
(7 March 2014).
43Id at para. 1125.
44International law rejects the defense that an actor was merely following orders in the commission of an oﬀense.:
12 A. J. COLANGELO AND P. HAYES
regard for why a strike order was followed, if a nuclear strike order is followed, this ﬁnal
requirement has been satisﬁed.
In turn, any nuclear strike near a civilian population would, where conventional
weapons could be used instead, likely fall within the deﬁnition of crimes against humanity
established by the ICC statute and its decisional progeny. If the same military objective
could be obtained by the use of conventional weapons, that may not be the case because
conventional weapons are capable of far more targeted application, especially in the age of
precision-guided munitions or “smart bombs” (Infeld 1992, 109–110).
Ecocide
In the words of the Advisory Opinion,45 the Court “recognizes that the environment is
under daily threat and that the use of nuclear weapons could constitute a catastrophe
for the environment” (para. 29). Moreover, the ICJ has observed “the existence of the
general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control
respect the environment of other states or of areas beyond national control is now part
of the corpus of international law relating to the environment” (para. 29). Under
international humanitarian law “[r]espect for the environment is one of the elements
that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity with principles of necessity and
proportionality” (para. 29). Furthermore, “Articles 35, paragraph 3, and 55 of
Additional Protocol I [of the Geneva Conventions] provide additional protection for
the environment” and “[t]aken together, these prohibitions embody a general obligation
to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe environ-
mental damage” (para. 31).
Key is “the prohibition of methods and means of warfare which are intended, or may
be expected, to cause such damage . . .” (para. 31). Ultimately, “while the existing
international law relating to the protection and safeguarding of the environment does
not speciﬁcally prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, it indicates important environ-
mental factors that are properly to be taken into account in the context of the
implementation of principles and rules of the law applicable in armed conﬂict” (para.
33). The ICC statute, for example, prohibits: “Intentionally launching an attack in the
knowledge that such attack will cause . . . widespread, long-term and severe damage to
the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct overall military advantage anticipated” (art. 8(b)(iv)).
Yet failure to include ecocide itself in the ICC statute left a major and, some might
say, studied hole as regards nuclear weapons. In the words of rapporteur Christian
Tomuschat,
One cannot escape the impression that nuclear arms played a decisive role in the minds of
many of those who opted for the ﬁnal text which now has been emasculated to such an
extent that its conditions of applicability will almost never be met even after humankind
would have gone through disasters of the most atrocious kind as a consequence of
conscious action by persons who were completely aware of the fatal consequences their
decisions would entail (Tomuschat 1996, 243).
Needless to say, the present proposal seeks to ﬁll the hole. Although the speciﬁc
prohibition on ecocide may still be “soft law” regarding the corpus of international
45Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 21 (July 8) (hereinafter “Advisory Opinion”).
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law, there is a trend in favor of legally prohibiting the crime (Higgins 2012). For present
and hortatory purposes, we adopt the oﬀense deﬁnition laid out in Polly Higgins’ Model
Law, which provides:
Ecocide crime is:
(1) acts or omissions committed recklessly in times of peace or conﬂict by any senior
person within the course of State, corporate or any other entity’s activity which
cause, contribute to, or may be expected to cause or contribute to serious
ecological, climate or cultural loss or damage to or destruction of ecosystem(s)
of a given territory(ies), such that peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants has
been or will be severely diminished.
(2) To establish seriousness, impact(s) must be widespread, long-term or severe.
(3) For the purposes of paragraph 1:
(a) “climate loss or damage to or destruction of” means impact(s) of one or
more of the following occurrences, unrestricted by State or jurisdictional
boundaries: (i) rising sea-levels, (ii) hurricanes, typhoons or cyclones, (iii)
earthquakes, (iv) other climate occurrences;
(b) “ecosystems” means a biological community of interdependent inhabitants
and their physical environment;
(c) “territory(ies)” means one or more of the following habitats, unrestricted by
State or jurisdictional boundaries: (i) terrestrial, (ii) fresh-water, marine or
high seas, (iii) atmosphere, (iv) other natural habitats;
(d) “peaceful enjoyment” means peace, health and cultural integrity;
(e) “inhabitants” means indigenous occupants and/or settled communities of
a territory consisting of one or more of the following: (i) humans, (ii)
animals, ﬁsh, birds or insects, (iii) plant species, (iv) other living organisms.
(4) For the purposes of paragraph 1: the Paris Agreement of 4 November 2016 shall be
considered to be established premise for prior knowledge by State, corporate or
any other entity’s senior person, or any other person of superior responsibility.
Elements of Ecological, Climate and Cultural Ecocide
(1) The perpetrator’s acts or omissions caused, contributed to, or may be expected to
cause or contribute to serious ecological, climate or cultural loss or damage to, or
destruction of ecosystem(s) of a given territory(ies).
(2) The perpetrator’s activity has or will severely diminish peaceful enjoyment by the
inhabitants.
(3) The perpetrator’s acts or omissions were reckless where the perpetrator had
knowledge or ought to have had knowledge of the likelihood of ecological,
climate or cultural harm.
(4) The perpetrator was a senior person within the course of State, corporate or any
other entity’s activity in times of peace or conﬂict. (Higgins n.d.)
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Again, nuclear weapons are devastating to the environment – their use may cause
depletion in the ozone layer, farming and food production, thereby resulting in
famine (Maresca and Mitchell 2015, 625)46 spanning large geographic and trans-
border spaces (Higgins 2015, 62).47 This is due in large part to the dispersal of dirt
and dust, contamination of water supplies by radioactive residuals, and deterioration
of both plant and animal life, posing a real and widespread risk of starvation for
many millions of people. In fact, using nuclear weapons for major attacks targeting
cities or other highly populated areas could cause short term or even prolonged
(decadal) nuclear winters (Sagan et al. 1983, 1283). A clause providing for the use of
conventional as opposed to nuclear weapons to achieve the same military objective
promises not only to protect the environment but also to create liability for ecocide
for those who choose the nuclear option.
Damages
Finally, we propose that an ITNW may order damages or reparations resulting from the
harms – especially environmental harms – that ﬂow from the use of nuclear weapons.
The relevant international law providing for reparations comes not so much from the
ICC but from the jurisprudence of the ICJ and, most powerfully, from the Draft Articles
on State Responsibility. According to article 36, paragraph 2 of the ICJ statute, states
parties recognize the Court’s jurisdiction over “The existence of any fact which, if
established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; [and] (d) The
nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international
obligation”.48
Syllogistically, the ﬁrst thing to do is tie the individual action that violates
international law to the state so as to hold the state liable for damages. The Draft
Articles on State Responsibility do just that. As the Draft Articles observe, “[w]here
crimes against international law are committed by State oﬃcials, it will often be the
case that the State itself is responsible for the acts in question or for failure to
prevent or punish them” (art. 58(3)). To be sure, “[i]n certain cases, in particular
aggression, the State will by deﬁnition be involved” (art. 58(3)). And “the State’s
responsibility is engaged by conduct incompatible with its international obligations,
irrespective of the level of administration or government at which the conduct
occurs” (Commentary (¶ 5)). Article 4 provides: “The conduct of any state organ
shall be considered an act of that State under international law . . . [a]n organ
includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal
law of the State”. Thus, no “distinction is made at the level of principle between the
acts of ‘superior’ and ‘subordinate’ oﬃcials, provided they are acting in their oﬃcial
capacity . . . [and] conduct carried out by [lower-level] oﬃcials in their oﬃcial
46“Of course, the two incidents which caused the greatest environmental calamity in the history of armed conﬂict were the
atomic bomb attacks on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945” (Schmitt 2000, 266–67).
47“The capacity of ecocide to be trans-boundary and multi-jurisdictional necessitates legislation of international scope”
(Higgins 2015, 62). “The destruction of large areas of the environment and ecosystems can be caused directly or
indirectly by various activities, such as nuclear testing . . . ” (63).
48Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, para. 2, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
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capacity is nonetheless attributable to the State . . .” (art. 4(7)). Similarly, Article 8
speciﬁes that:
The conduct of a person or a group of persons shall be considered an act of State under
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of,
or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.
Moreover, “[n]or does any distinction exist between the ‘civil’ and ‘criminal’ responsi-
bility as is the case in internal legal systems” (art. 12(5)). Taking these principles as
a point of departure, the Draft Articles eﬀectively outline the State’s responsibility for
reparations under international law by the acts of individuals – including low-level
crewmembers who may or may not have suﬃcient information to launch a nuclear strike.
We next move onto whether reparations are warranted and the form they may take.
According toArticle 31, “[t]he responsible State is under an obligation tomake full reparation
for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. Injury includes any damage, whether
material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of the state”. Importantly, an
injury may be “any direct loss, damage including environmental damage and the depletion of
natural resources”.49 Nor is the injury limited in scope to a single state; it may extend to
multiple states50 and/or the international community as a whole.51 Examples include “a
nuclear-free zone treaty, or any other treaty where each party’s performance is eﬀectively
conditioned upon and requires the performance of each of the others” (art. 42(23)) and, as will
be discussed, violations of peremptory norms of international law, called jus cogens.
As to multiple states being injured by the same internationally wrongful act, the
Draft Articles speciﬁcally point to “the Nuclear Tests cases, [in which] Australia and
New Zealand each claimed to be injured in various ways by the French conduct of
atmospheric nuclear tests at Mururoa Atoll” (art. 46(3)).
As to the form the reparations may take, “[f]ull reparation for the injury caused by the
internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfac-
tion, either singly or in combination, . . .”(art. 34). Generally speaking, the measure of
reparations is to restore the status quo ante (art. 35(a)), but there may be circumstances
where “re-establishment of the situation which existed before the breach may not be
suﬃcient for full reparation because the wrongful act has caused additional material
damage” (art. 34(10)). Signiﬁcantly for the proposal of this Article, “an international court
or tribunal can, by determining the legal position with binding force for the parties, award
what amounts to restitution under another form” (art. 35(5)). And “‘restitution’ . . . has
a broad meaning, encompassing any action that needs to be undertaken by the responsible
State to restore the situation resulting from its internationally wrongful act” (art. 35(5)).
Damages may also be remedied by compensation to the injured state or states,
including injuries ﬂowing from environmental damage. Comment 14 to Article
49Id. at art. 31(10) (quoting S.C. Res. 687, para. 16 (3 April 1991)). Somewhat similarly, in the context of compensation, damage
may include the “costs incurred in responding to [environmental damage, like] like pollution damage”. Id. at art. 36(8).
50Id. at Part Three: The Implementation of the International Responsibility of a State: Chapter I: Invocation of the
Responsibility of a State (2)(“more than one State may be injured by an internationally wrongful act and be entitled
to invoke responsibility as an injured State) Id. at art. 46 (Where several States are injured by the same internationally
wrongful act, each injured State may separately invoke the responsibility of the State which has committed the
internationally wrongful act”).
51Id. at art. 33 (“The obligations of the responsible State set out in this Part may be owed to another State, to several
States or to the international community as a whole, depending in particular on the character and content of the
international obligation and on the circumstances of the breach”.).
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36(14) speciﬁes “environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources”. Article
36(15) is devoted entirely to environmental damages, stating:
In cases where compensation has been awarded or agreed following an internationally
wrongful act that causes or threatens environmental damage, payments have been directed
to reimbursing the injured State for expenses reasonably incurred in preventing or
remedying the pollution, or to providing compensation for a reduction in the value of
polluted property. However, environmental damage will often extend beyond that which
can be readily quantiﬁed in terms of clean-up costs or property devaluation. Damage to
such environmental values (biodiversity, amenity, etc., – sometimes referred to as ‘non-use
values’) is, as a matter of principle, no less real and compensable than damage to property,
though it may be diﬃcult to quantify.
Nuclear weapons, of course, may aﬀect non-nuclear states’ individual citizens as well,
not just the environment.52 As with environmental harms, these damages are often the
subject of adjudicative decision-making and judgments (art. 36(18), (20)).
After laying out these general principles relating to damages, the Draft Articles
directly address jus cogens violations, including war crimes53 and, in particular, the
crime of aggression (art. 26(5)). As the Draft Articles explain, all states have an interest
in the suppression of violations of jus cogens.54 Indeed, “for the purposes of State
responsibility, certain obligations are owed to the international community as
a whole, and that by reason of the ‘importance of the rights involved’ all States have
a legal interest in their protection”.55 “Among these [jus cogens] prohibitions, it is
generally agreed that the prohibition of aggression is to be regarded as peremptory”
(art. 40(4)).
The history of reparations for oﬀenses against international law is well established
and robust. Prior agreements between warring nations after hostilities have ended
setting the baseline for state practice and opinio juris – the two components of
customary law56 – providing for reparations resulting from war crimes and acts of
aggression. For example, after World War II, “reparations . . . became a principal object
of Allied diplomacy” and “placed the obligation to provide restitution to victims of Nazi
persecution on the new West German government”.57 By 2000, more than 100 billion
deutschmarks were paid out.58 Further, to compensate those with insurance-related
claims Germany entered into an agreement with the United States to create a fund of
10 billion deutschmarks to compensate those “who suﬀered at the hands of German
companies during the National Socialist era”.59 This fund was then supplemented with
52Id. at 36(16) (“a good deal of guidance is available as to appropriate compensation standards and methods of
valuation, especially as concerns personal injury. . .. It is well established that a State may seek compensation in
respect of personal injuries suﬀered by its oﬃcials or nationals, over and above any direct injury it may itself have
suﬀered in relation to the same event”).
53Id. at Chapter III, Serious Breaches of Obligations Under Peremptory Norms of General International Law (6)
(explaining that “[t]he Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court likewise establishes jurisdiction over the
‘most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.’”). As noted above, war crimes fall within
the jurisdiction of the ICC.
54Id. at Chapter III, Serious Breaches of Obligations Under Peremptory Norms of General International Law (2).
55Id; See also Id. at (7) (“serious breaches of obligations arising under peremptory norms of general international law
can attract additional consequences, not only for the responsible State but for all other States [and] all States are
entitled to invoke responsibility for breaches of obligations to the international community as a whole”).
56Opinio juris refers to the psychological element that the state is following the practice out of a sense of legal obligation.
57Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 at 403–04 (2003).
58Id. at 404.
59Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future”, 39 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1298 (2000).
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550 million deutschmarks for additional insurance-related claims and for
a “‘humanitarian fund’ . . . [that] agreed to work with the German Insurance
Association and [. . .] German insurers”.60 This agreement with Germany served as
a model for Austria and France and is the basis for similar agreements with Austria,
France, and agreements the United States is pursuing with other countries.61 Following
both World Wars, it was acknowledged that the losing states should pay reparations,
and against the majority of states reparations were exacted.62 Although this is the
history, we would propose that aggressor states pay reparations to non-aggressor states
as a general rule, albeit one that may be diﬃcult to enforce as a practical matter in some
cases.
Part II: Eﬀects on Individual Personnel
We now transition from the normative to the descriptive. For the ﬁrst time, through
a series of interviews and electronic communications, we have gathered empirical and
anecdotal information regarding the actual processes of launch instructions to lower
level crewmembers and, in particular, those who refused the order – or “refuseniks”.
What emerges from these accounts is the startling reality that low-level crewmembers
had little or no guidance on the legality of the strike under the laws of war but were told
simply to trust their leadership. A tribunal statute geared speciﬁcally to the use of
nuclear weapons would provide needed guidance and constitute solid legal grounds
upon which to stand should those lower down in the chain of command ﬁnd the order
manifestly illegal under international law. It is a foundational building block of the rule
of law that law must be available and intelligible for it to be followed. In other words,
the less I know the law and the less I am able to decipher and apply it to my behavior,
the less I can comply with the law. (Hall 1960, 59).63 And it follows that a law that
cannot be obeyed is no law at all. (Colangelo 2012, 71–72). Here it is not just the law
that must be ascertainable but also knowledge of the conditions for its application. The
actor must have available both law and facts for law to operate.
By amalgamating various sources of international law, including international and
national court statutes and opinions, Security Council Resolutions, and treaties, it is the
authors’ hope to weave together an accessible and decipherable international law
regarding the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This international law may not
60Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 407.
61Id. at 408.
62See, e.g. Treaty of Peace With Italy art. 74 (10 February 1947) 49 U.N.T.S. 3, 335. Agreement on German External Debts,
(27 February 1953), 333 U.N.T.S. 4. For further information on Central Power and Axis Power debts following the
World Wars, see Treaty of Peace with Finland art. 23 (10 February 1947), 48 U.N.T.S. 240; Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria
art. 21 (10 February 1947), 41 U.N.T.S. 64; Treaty of Peace with Romania art. 22 (10 February 1947), 42 U.N.T.S. 3;
Treaty of Peace with Hungary art. 23 (10 February 1947), 41 U.N.T.S. 186.
63Notably, “secret laws” seem to contravene the principle of legality. Using one commentator’s deﬁnition, secret laws
are those “legal authorities which require compliance that are classiﬁed or otherwise withheld from the public”
(Rudesill 2016, 249). In plain terms, a secret law is a law that must be obeyed but is not generally known or
ascertainable. “Meta-secrecy”, where the very existence of the law is unknown (as opposed to a law that is secret in
content but known to exist) poses a grave threat to the perceived legitimacy of a governmental regime (Kutz n.d.).
The nuclear command hierarchy imposes exactly such a system: The military law requires obedience without the
knowledge required to know if obedience would be unlawful. While the law requiring obedience itself is not secret,
the underlying requisite knowledge often is. These concerns are alleviated through the existence of a tribunal to
address nuclear crimes by making the knowledge necessary both ascertainable and, ideally, actually known to actors
in the nuclear chain of command.
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only have a strong deterrent eﬀect on those charged with launching a manifestly illegal
nuclear strike but also will supply those lower in the command chain who may or may
not have full information regarding a nuclear strike with legal grounds to resist the
order unless given speciﬁc information regarding the strike.
As to deterrence, an international tribunal of the kind described above would not only
be available to prosecute nuclear war crimes, before or after actual nuclear use, thereby
bringing some form of restitution to the survivors, if any. It would also send a deliberate
message to nuclear commanders and in all nuclear weapons states (and to non-state
actors aspiring to obtain and/or use nuclear weapons) that they will be held accountable
for nuclear war crimes, thereby inducing an additional reason to act prudently, to avoid
nuclear wars, and to not take risks using nuclear weapons to project threat.
Now, one might argue that compared with the direct costs arising from nuclear war
to the values held dear by national nuclear commanders – their own lives, those of their
kin and communities, their governments, even their entire nation, possibly humanity
itself – that the marginal dissuasion against nuclear use due to possible apprehension
and prosecution by an international tribunal would be insigniﬁcant or somehow
epiphenomenal. This might be the case for large or all-out nuclear wars, but it seems
less likely that being held accountable would play no role at all in protracted or limited
nuclear wars, and it is these that many strategic thinkers feel are the pathway to all-out
or general nuclear war.
Next, below the level of the national nuclear command are many ranks of civilian
and military personnel who also must act on strike orders, and without whom no
nuclear weapons could be ﬁred and used.64 Whether such personnel might balk at
following nuclear ﬁre orders in an actual crisis or war is also worth examining, not
least because these individuals have no less an ethical duty and legal obligation to not
follow manifestly illegal nuclear ﬁre orders than their commanders. What is good for
the commander who issues a ﬁre order is logically good for the foot soldier who must
act on the order and actually deliver the weapon, including all the supporting actions
along the way to make delivery possible such as target identiﬁcation, communications,
custodial security, refueling, damage assessment, etc., whether civilian or military.
Each and every one of these individuals has a right to not commit a nuclear war
crime, and each has a legal obligation to not do so. These are not their only obligation;
they are also obliged to defend their countries and to maintain their domestic laws
and military traditions that also bear on their actions. But Nuremberg established that
individuals at all levels, not just the high commanders, were accountable, and that
following orders was no defense if the individual knew that his actions would lead to
war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes of aggression, or genocide. Indeed, as
Kevin Heller reminded the authors, “foot soldiers [and civilians] are the only ones
who are even arguably entitled to the defense of superior orders” (Kevin Heller, email
to author, July 1, Heller 2017). As Heller notes, according to the Nuremberg tribunal
a defendant would be held responsible for issuing an illegal order if (1) the order was
issued by a superior to a subordinate; (2) the defendant bore some responsibility for
64Kevin Heller notes that the Nuremberg tribunals “had little diﬃculty extending command responsibility to civilians
who exercised eﬀective control over subordinates” (Heller 2017, 265). There are many civilians involved in preparing,
ordering, and implementing nuclear strike orders, at least in the US nuclear weapons enterprise.
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the order and (3) the defendant knew or should have known that the order was illegal.
(Heller 2017, 254).
The simple act of transmitting an order was deemed illegal in two situations:
First, where an order was facially illegal – that is, the law enacted by the order was
always illegal and void–an act of transmission was deemed of the same criminality
as issuing the order. Second, where an order was not facially illegal but could be
applied in a criminal manner, oﬃcers who failed to safeguard the application of the
order against criminality were deemed to have criminal liability (257). Further, the
tribunal had no qualms with applying command responsibilities to civilian actors
when those actors had control over military subordinates (265). This, in particular,
is of interest in the United States. Civilian actors in positions of control in the
nuclear chain of command, such as those who might advise the president or be
privy to pending nuclear strike orders, could be held accountable under this pre-
cedent. The same logic applies in all states engaged in nuclear aggression.
Actual cases of individuals who have refused to act on nuclear ﬁre orders are of particular
interest in this regard in clarifying the role that an international tribunal might have for all
personnel, not just senior commanders. We review three such instances below to ascertain
what role if any international law played in their decisions to not follow nuclear ﬁre orders,
and their consideration of ethical, procedural and other pragmatic concerns that motivated
their actions.65
Case 1: Mace Missile Unit, Okinawa 1962
The ﬁrst instance took place on 28 October 1962 in Okinawa at the height of the Cuban
Missile Crisis and was recounted only recently by John Bordne. At the time, he was an
Air Force airman with the 498th Tactical Missile Group stationed at a US base in
65These cases all involve Americans. They are likely not the only such cases within the US military concerning nuclear
ﬁre orders, but they are the only ones we know of that are documented publicly. The cases of US Defense Secretary
Schlesinger, and recently, Mattis, having inserted themselves informally into the nuclear strike command hierarchy
out of concern as to the rationality of presidential decision-making are salient, but diﬀerent because the US Defense
Secretary is not directly involved in acting on nuclear strike orders and therefore, cannot disobey them (Kutler 2014;
Gronlund 2018; Blair and Wolfstahl 2018; Wellerstein 2017). There may well have been “nuclear refuseniks” in other
countries who refused to obey nuclear ﬁre orders. The only example the authors know of is that of Captain Vasili
Archipov, a Soviet nuclear submariner who reportedly blocked an order to ﬁre nuclear-armed torpedoes at a US
surface warship during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It would be interesting to examine this case to see what role legal
concerns played in the decisions made in this incident, but we did not attempt to do so here (Burr and Blanton 2002).
Note also that UK submarine commanders appear to be in exactly this invidious position with regard to action on
nuclear ﬁre orders without knowing the target coordinates. In a March 26, 2019 hearing of the UK Public
Administration and Constitutional Aﬀairs Committee, Lord West of Spithead stated with regard to UK Trident
submarine commanding oﬃcers (CO): “For example, wiping out a whole city is very understandably completely
illegal under international law and normally there are certain bases to do these things. Because of this ﬂexible sub-
strategic response, what that in theory allows is use of a nuclear weapon. Rather than your total response to us being
wiped out, a single nuclear weapon for a speciﬁc reason. Where that is targeted the submarine CO will not know,
because none of our warheads at the moment are targeted. They are untargeted. What happens is when the codes
come through, if it is a ﬂexible response, he will have a single missile and one warhead that will be targeted
somewhere. He will not know what it is and yet in international law as the man who says “go” he will be responsible
for this. Do you see what I am getting at? That needs to be clariﬁed, I believe, and it needs to be removed from him. I
think that is important”. In Public Administration and Constitutional Aﬀairs Committee, “The Role of Parliament in the
UK Constitution: Authorising the Use of Military Force - oral evidence”, 20 May 2019, consulted May 31, 2019,
at: https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-administration-and-con
stitutional-aﬀairs-committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/authorising-use-military-force-inquiry-17-19/publications/.
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Okinawa, Japan, in charge of a Mace nuclear-armed missile unit that targeted the
former Soviet Union and China.
Although his account is contested (Tritten 2015) and may prove diﬃcult to document
deﬁnitively due to the time that has elapsed, the incident as reported is of great interest. In this
case, Bordne’s Mace nuclear missile unit was ordered to ﬁre its weapons at the former Soviet
Union andChina (Tovish 2015). Bordne found this order to be disconcerting not just because
it entailed ﬁring nuclear weapons, but because the authenticated ﬁre order was contextually
inconsistent – the unit was not on the highest state of alert (Defcon 1) but only on high alert
(Defcon 2). After receiving the order to ﬁre a second time, appended strangely to a weather
report, he explains:
The lack of resolution to the conﬂicting orders despite the reissuance of the launch code
was very disturbing. I noticed a lack of urgency in the voice when the code was retrans-
mitted which seemed to negate the above concerns. This observation was also noticed by
all others in the launch control room as well. This prompted the launch oﬃcer to request
an upgrade to DEFCON 1 or the issuance of the cancellation code. The cancelation code
was hastily transmitted, with urgency, along with a request for all launch sites to give status
reports.
Asked what motivated the refusal to simply launch the missiles, Bordne asserts that he
was attempting to act sensibly and had been directed to do so by his superior:
Our launch oﬃcer told us that we had to be right about our decision. We basically had
three options.
(1) If we were wrong and we did not launch missiles when we should have, and
survived the retaliation strike, we would be tried for treason and probably shot.
(2) If we were wrong and we launched missiles when we should not have, and
survived the retaliation, we would be tried for treason and probably shot.
(3) Get it right and nothing would be said.
One and two above was motivation for us choosing. Number three was our only option.
(John Bordne, email to author, 14 August 2017)
In this instance – which took place within only a few hours of a separate incident
involving a Soviet submarine in the Atlantic that reportedly came close to ﬁring
a nuclear-torpedo at a US surface warship – the individuals involved in the Mace
unit including Bordne knew that their targets were cities in the former Soviet Union,
China, North Korea and Vietnam. It is clear that if orders had come consistent with
a higher alert level, and not aimed at non-belligerent states, that they likely would have
followed orders and ﬁred their nuclear weapons at these cities, irrespective of the
questions of military necessity, proportionality, or protecting civilians. As Bordne states
bluntly, “Legality was of no concern” (John Bordne, email to author, 14 August 2017).
Rather than protest, those involved simply chose to remain silent – until ﬁve decades
later.
JOURNAL FOR PEACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 21
Case 2: Atomic Demolition Mine Combat Engineer, 1968 Korea
In the second case, this time in Korea in 1968, a US combat engineer named Michael
Roach found himself responsible for using a US atomic demolition mine (ADM) in one
of two ways (Michael Roach, interview transcript, New York, December 1987; Michael
Roach, email to author, 29 September 2017). At the outset of his tour of duty, insists
Roach, “I was a loyal army crewmember and fully ready to carry out any mission
assigned to our ADM unit, even ones that involved the death of tens of thousands of
ROK civilians. Our access to strategic military intelligence, military planning and
targeting was very limited” (Michael Roach, email to author, 29 September 2017).
However, Roach found himself increasingly unconvinced that the plan to use
ADMs crafted in the late ﬁfties made military sense in the late sixties due to the
urban growth around his designated use site, the city of Uijongbu plus the absurdity
of blowing up Seoul with nuclear weapons to save its population. He explains the
planned use:
The necessity of Americans using tactical ADM’s was developed from analysis of the North
Korean (NK) armored attack that started the Korean War at the beginning of the 1950’s.
The NK forces employed overwhelming quantities of armor units to advance down the
“bowling alley” (that is, the valley running North-South for 50 miles directly from the
DMZ to Seoul with no natural obstacles along the way). Within days, NK forces reached
Seoul and rapidly advanced southward until they occupied almost the entire territory of
the ROK.
To prevent the repeat of such an attack after the ceaseﬁre of the “Korean Conﬂict”,
U.S. military planners decided to use tactical ADM’s to stop NK armor forces before
they reached Seoul. Actually, there were two plans. One was the U.N.-ROK plan that
envisioned placing ADM’s at three chokepoints on the major entrances to Seoul about 20
miles outside of the city center. To block a main NK armor advance down the bowling
alley, a device(s) was to be detonated near the city of Uijongbu area in the center of an
urban area of approximately 100,000 residents located about 10 miles directly north of
Seoul. The bowling alley was the most vulnerable approach to Seoul. Alternatively, NK
armor forces could ﬂank around on the west along the littoral coast or through the
mountain passes northeast of Seoul. With ADM’s detonated at these three entrances,
a ring of atomic defense could be established that could immediately halt NK armor
advances by blast eﬀect and slow down further military (especially infantry) movements
because of radiated deﬁle battle zones. This strategy was necessary because the ROK did
not have the quantitative military forces to counter such a massive attack from NK. The
atomic ring would give them time to reinforce Seoul and delay any further advances.
The American military forces had a diﬀerent plan. Although the atomic ring strategy could
buy a short amount of time, it would probably not deﬁnitively stop a NK armor advance.
They believed that a stronger defensive position was to blow up the major bridges in Seoul
that spanned the Han River and take up defensive positions on the south shore of the Han
and ﬁght from there using the natural barrier of the large river. The Han is very wide as it
passes Seoul so that it would be very diﬃcult for NK forces to construct temporary bridges
to cross the river. The American plan focused particularly on destroying the footings of all
the bridges with ADM’s to prevent any rapid reconstruction of permanent bridges.
These two plans were not necessarily mutually exclusive since the ring strategy could be
employed ﬁrst and then the bridge and footings strategy used as a backup. Our ADM
platoon had prospective target sites in both plans. (Michael Roach, email to author,
29 September 2017)
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With time on the job and training and exercises, he began to ﬁnd serious ﬂaws in the
war plan for using ADMs in Korea:
In my job in the ADM platoon, I reviewed all of our targets so that our unit was familiar
with what we would have to accomplish depending upon which target assignment we
received. In reviewing the target proﬁles, a couple of items of “impracticability” bothered
me. The plans were probably written in the mid-1950’s, but by the late 1960’s when
I served in the ROK, the assembly sites and other geographic features were entirely
diﬀerent. Where the old plans described open rice paddy areas for military use, by the
time I served 15 years later most of these rural plots had been overwhelmed by vast and
dense areas of urbanization spreading out from Seoul, especially northward towards
Uijongbu. Traﬃc congestion on poor roads in this urban area slowed vehicle movement
to a crawl most of the time. Therefore, ground transportation of atomic devices would
have been impossible during a military outbreak. We had helicopters available for our
delivery use but this air route was not a really a reliable delivery means because of potential
enemy engagements of any operational aircraft in the combat zone. (Michael Roach, email
to author, 29 September 2017)
Roach notes that he knew the precise targets of his ADM, and became acutely aware of
the large number of civilian casualties and enormous damage to innocent humans that
would result from him implementing the war plan, both at the site of use and
downwind:
In our training, we never were alerted to the intended eﬀects of a detonation other than
military objectives of ensuring proper detonation. Collateral damage was included in target
folders but this information was not accessible to most ADM crewmembers. In contrast,
I read every target folder we had and tried to understand the broader picture of what we were
involved in. I had a diﬃcult time looking ordinary Koreans in the eye, when I knew that their
fate was in our hands and that they had no glimmer of what was in store for them if atomic
war plans were ever engaged. In the Uijongbu area with 100,000 residents, an atomic
detonation could have easily killed or injured most of the Koreans that I saw every day.
On reﬂection about the eﬀects of detonating multiple atomic bombs in the ROK, I also saw
that the radiation plumes would carry over to Japan and then onward to California.
I realized that our ADM unit was the last link in the chain of command. We were the
soldiers that actually “pulled the trigger” on unleashing nuclear blast, thermal energy and
residual radiation. (Michael Roach, email to author, 29 September 2017)
The fact that Roach knew the locations of the targets is similar to the Okinawan case in
that Bordne also knew that cities were targeted, which ones, and the likely consequences
of such an attack, in contrast to the ignorance of submarine and land-based missile
personnel today who likely would not know the targeted location of their weapon when
they ﬁre it (unlike the bomber crews who likely would). But Roach’s case diﬀers from
Bordne’s in that the intimacy of his knowledge of the populations at risk from attacking
his designated targets aﬀected him profoundly over a long period of time as the
ludicrous nature of the war plan became increasingly evident – in contrast to the
very short time frame of the Bordne incident. As he stated:
On the Han River, they used this cryptic military jargon: “due to heavy population, expect
severe damage”. Damage ranged from low, low to moderate, moderate to high. It was only
when you sat down and said, Christ, Seoul is 8 million people, what does it mean to set oﬀ
a device, or multiple devices, south of the city. We were not talking tens of thousands
killed or wounded, we were talking hundreds of thousands of civilians. And because
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refugees would have been in the streets, casualties would have been even higher than states
in the [target] ﬁle. (Michael Roach, interview, 1987)
This human reality made Roach rethink the realism and military authenticity of the
plan to use ADMs:
I thought of the city and all the Koreans around me not knowing about the control other
people have over their lives. They were oblivious to the whole issue. Later it forced me to
evaluate at a military level, is this sound military planning? At 19 years old, I was a real
functionalist. I would ask: are these weapons and these plans going to carry out what they
say? I found them to be out of date, hypocritical, or corrupt. They never played for real.
(Michael Roach, interview transcript, New York, December 1987)
Consequently, Roach began to commit the cardinal sin in a military hierarchy, which is
to question the validity and the soundness of his role and orders. He asked himself:
In Vietnam, the same kind of thinking ended up killing a lot of troops. I couldn’t tell if it was
the aristocracy of command, or that they knew what was really going on. But I asked: am
I going to be the one who pulls the trigger and kills ¼ of a million people. Whatever the
political objectives, I knew this was fucked. (Michael Roach, interview transcript, New York,
December 1987)
Then he began to push back and up the command chain:
I started out as a squad member. Then I became the clerk. I handled intelligence ﬁles,
security, crypto work. I was bored and switched to an intelligence position at the battalion
level. That’s where I got into trouble. The procedure in the oplans was that if a part doesn’t
work, you put a request through G3 to alter it. I sent in piles. They never did anything.
I was too stupid to let it go. One morning I went into the oﬃce of the colonel of the ADM
unit with oﬃcers from the battalion as witnesses, and said that I had made 20 points where
the oplans were out of date, and there had been no response. In retrospect, what I was
saying was accusing the colonel of incompetence. He threatened me with court martial,
reassigning me to Vietnam where I would have been a combat engineer defusing booby
traps, for insubordination, they tried to revoke my security clearance. At the court martial,
due to the security clearance, the same people who were accusing me would have tried me.
The only person with clearance who could defend me was the AG [Adjutant General] in
Seoul who also would have been prosecuting. I had the captain mediate. I left the job, went
to another base (I was already out of the ADM unit by that time) and agreed to see
a shrink. (Michael Roach, interview transcript, New York, December 1987)
Clearly, Roach’s evolution from willing ADM “suicide bomber” to outright skeptic and
critic within the command hierarchy was driven by a combination of distress at the
unprofessional, even shambolic nature of the training and planned use of ADMs from
a military perspective along with the potentially catastrophic civilian damages from
actually using ADMs according to the war plan.
Roach admits that at the time he did not have a high-level view of the tradeoﬀs
involved in using nuclear weapons in Korea but that it was starkly clear that the war
plan was non-sensical, transgressed basic laws and norms of war, and was driven by
procedure and training intended to obtain unthinking compliance from those charged
with delivering the nuclear weapons, almost certainly at the cost of their own lives. In
large part, it was the carelessness that was presented in the war plan, the fact that the
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war plan was a sham, and not the weapons or nuclear missions per se, that outraged
Roach. He concluded that:
The sole concern was training to manipulate a technical device. I didn’t know enough at the
time to evaluate if nuking Seoul was worth the political objective. That’s also why there was no
political indoctrination. All the military command wants is humans to interface with technol-
ogy without questioning, to complete a complex series of instructions in a rigidly deﬁned
manner. The focus of attention was exclusively on that. They even made it overly complex.We
had to put the devices into insulated barrels. The lid had to be tightened to just this torque.
They would overawe people just barely out of their teens with pseudo-technical procedure.
There were never any political questions, or even questions about your own personal safety if
you detonated one of these weapons. You were inspected every 8 weeks with a lot of oﬃcers.
When CINCPAC [Commander in Chief, US Paciﬁc Command at the time] came around,
you’d get 15 majors, colonels, herds of brass. So there was a great emphasis on the importance
of a limited range of technical procedures. No-one would question this. This is the way it’s
done. (Michael Roach, interview transcript, New York, December 1987)
Five decades later, Roach notes that from the viewpoint of modern international law,
planned use of tactical nuclear weapons like ADMs in Korea at the time he was serving
in Korea likely met at least the necessity criterion of legality “because of the deﬁciency
of ROK conventional forces in turning back a North Korean attack and the low-yield of
ADM’s demonstrates only an incremental and time-compacted increase in destruction
relative to conventional mass ﬁre attacks” (Michael Roach, email to author,
29 September 2017). By the same token, he suggests, the cremation of about 50
Japanese cities by U.S. incendiary bombing during World War II killed far more
Japanese civilians than nuclear weapons did at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Thus, Roach
was not opposed to the use of nuclear weapons per se. Rather, he objected to partici-
pating knowingly in poorly planned and badly executed attacks based on obsolete facts
and implemented in a pro forma, bureaucratic manner that if enacted, would have led
to catastrophic results. Unlike Bordne, he paid the price for his opposition by not
staying silent.
Today, he suggests, ADMs would not be needed because the built-up nature of the
attack corridors south of the DMZ makes it relatively easy to block the rapid advance of
armored troops without resort to nuclear weapons. Conversely, an argument might be
made that massive use of tactical nuclear weapons might be militarily justiﬁed to
suppress artillery and rocket barrage of civilians in Seoul and strategic weapons might
be militarily justiﬁed to destroy the DPRK’s military command in Pyongyang, albeit at
a high cost in civilian lives – thereby posing a tradeoﬀ between saving civilian lives in
the ROK versus those in the DPRK. Thus, the targeting calculus has shifted; but the
underlying issues have not.
Case 3: Major Hering Challenges the Legitimacy of Presidential Command,
1975
Unlike the ﬁrst two cases that were not public at the time they occurred, the third case
was highly public. It took place in 1975 when Major Harold Hering, a decorated US Air
Force major and helicopter pilot, directly confronted his nuclear commanders on the
need to know about the sanity of a nuclear strike order. Wrote Hering:
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I had just returned from a volunteer assignment as a Rescue Helicopter Unit Commander
in support of combat operations in Southeast Asia when I volunteered for Missile Duty.
I had a promotion to Lt Colonel pending on my birthday, Feb 1st, 1974, and was destined
to be one of two Squadron Commanders of the 90th Missile Wing, F.E.Warren AFB, WY,
when I was removed from Missile Training at Vandenburg AFB, CA, about 6 days before
graduation. (Harold Hering, email to author, 29 August 2017)
Yet on 12 January 1975, The New York Times reported that Hering had been discharged
from the Air Force because he insisted that he was morally obligated to be assured that
a nuclear missile launch order was valid before acting on it (New York Times 1975). In
this instance, therefore, the individual’s concern was not primarily ethical or proce-
dural, but essentially legal – and that lack of necessary information about control and
command and the legality of strikes led him, in turn, to doubt the legality of his orders.
According to his lawyer in the Air Force hearing, “He has asked what checks and
balances there are to assure that a launch order could not be aﬀected by the President
gone berserk, or by some foreign penetration of the command system”; and, “what
safeguards are in existence at the highest level of government to protect against an
unlawful launch” (New York Times 1975).66
The Air Force denied Hering’s request on the grounds that the fallibility of the
nuclear command system was above his “need to know” at the combat crew level, and
then its Review Board declared him to be unreliable, and recommended he be removed
from active duty due to failure to discharge and having a “defective” attitude towards
his duties. (Harold Hering, email to author, 29 August 2017).
As noted above, unlike the earlier cases, Hering’s concern was distinctly not moti-
vated by ethical concerns. According to General Russell Doughtery, the head of the
USAF at the time who personally monitored the case, he was entirely willing to ﬁre
nuclear weapons at designated targets:
The major’s hesitation initiated extensive hearings and administrative procedures. Later he
professed that he really would turn keys and that his hesitation had been misunderstood.
I examined the record thoroughly and discovered that, for a fact, he had repeated several
times in the record that he would turn keys [to ﬁre missiles in the silos], but that in each
instance his aﬃrmative assertion was followed immediately by a personal, subjective
qualiﬁcation. Yes, he would turn keys upon receipt of an authentic order from proper
authority: if he thought the order was legal; if he thought that the circumstances necessi-
tated an ICBM launch; if he was convinced that it was a rational, moral necessity; and so
on. Every aﬃrmative answer was qualiﬁed by a subjective condition. (Dougherty 1987,
414)
That “subjective condition”, according to Hering, amounted to seeking “basic informa-
tion about checks and balances at the NCA (National Command Authority) level for
conscience formation for me and all Missile Launch Oﬃcers to preclude my possible
unknowing involvement in an unauthorized or illegal order resulting in mass casualties
to innocent people” (Harold Hering, email to author, 29 August 2017).
66Corruption of the nuclear strike order system by a foreign power was also a concern in the 1962 Okinawa incident.
States Bordne: “Concerns of KGB activity similar to the events in Germany which took 24 MACE B missiles out was
discussed. Also, the possibility [that] a pre-emptive strike by Russia and the warheads were already on the downward
trajectory, or a brief conventional war began which quickly became nuclear, [were] of grave concern. The escalation
of the war between China and India was a brief concern along with other worldly events by suspected KGB
personnel” (John Bordne, email to author, 14 August 2017).
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Hering could have asked the same question about orders to ﬁre conventional or
other weapons. But nuclear weapons are diﬀerent. First, they are many orders of
magnitude more destructive than conventional weapons, may be delivered in less
than an hour from halfway around the planet, and have instantaneous and uniquely
damaging eﬀects including from radiation that is multi-generational. Second, in the US
nuclear command system, only one person ultimately evaluates the necessity, propor-
tionality and other distinctive civilian damages from nuclear use and judges whether or
not to ﬁre the weapons – the president.
The American way of nuclear command is not unique. Other nuclear weapons states
also attribute absolute decision-making to a single leader. North Korea, for example,
has vested the same power in the person of Kim Jong Un (Mansourov 2014). In the US
case, it was precisely the inherent nature of nuclear threat, involving political, philoso-
phical and moral choices that are not military in nature, and the risk that a nuclear-
armed enemy might “decapitate” the US leadership while it was trying to decide how to
respond, that drove the United States to elevate the locus of nuclear ﬁre ordering to the
US president, with a direct line of command to the US Joint Chiefs and then to the
operational forces, without regard to his political and military advisors, Congress, or the
judiciary (Wellerstein 2017).67 Whereas all other nuclear weapons decisions and hand-
ling were subject to the two-person rule in the US military, the president’s use authority
was based on one-person rule.
Dougherty made sure that Hering was drummed out of the Air Force altogether to
ensure the absolute nature of compliance with nuclear ﬁre orders. This determination
came from the top, that is, from General Dougherty himself, and was intended to send
a message to the entire nuclear force:
My decision, as the responsible commander, taken without malice or disrespect, was that
this oﬃcer was not qualiﬁed for missile duty in SAC and, in fact, should not be retained in
the Air Force. The US military has no place for oﬃcers, noncommissioned oﬃcers, or
other enlisted persons who apply their own subjective conditions to the decision to act on
a valid order from proper authority. I thought the United States required, and had a right
to expect, a disciplined response to authority, not a personal debate . . . This should not be
construed as denying anyone in the military the right to entertain a personal opinion or
view on any matter, but if that personal view comes in conﬂict with execution of a proper
order, it must give. (Dougherty 1987, 414)
Thus, Hering never got an answer from the US Air Force to his fundamental question:
How could he know that a nuclear ﬁre order was not somehow aﬀected by corruption,
foreign inﬂuence, or mental disorders?
In reality, this question was impossible to answer, which is why the decision had
been punted to the president in the ﬁrst place. Indeed, Hering’s challenge led Rod
Rosenbaum to investigate the issue in 1978. Rosenbaum’s journalistic engagement with
the command and control of US nuclear weapons forces, each of which had its own
narrow organizational logic, cultural integrity and internally consistent technical ration-
ality, led him to conclude that the enterprise itself was the embodiment of group
insanity (Rosenbaum 1978, 85–105). The authentication of a nuclear ﬁre order, he
67Listen also to Wellerstein’s interview with Hering in “Nukes”, Radiolab, 7 April 2017, at: https://www.wnycstudios.org/
story/nukes.
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found, related only to the identity of the person issuing the order, not that person’s
sanity or mental capacity, and it followed that no matter who was in this position, the
logical ﬂaws, strategic contradictions and irresoluble paradoxes created by the very
nature of nuclear war rendered presidential nuclear decision-making irrational and
emotional, no matter how sane or rational the incumbent of the day. It followed that
there is no way to respond to Hering’s question about the sanity of a ﬁre order.
Rosenbaum revisited the Hering case in 2011 and then examined the same issue in
diﬀerent contexts involving Israel, Pakistan, post-Cold War U.S.-Russian relations, and
came to the same conclusion. Nuclear holocaust, even of the pre-emptive kind intended
to limit damage, let alone all-out spasmodic and a-strategic retaliation for nuclear
attack, could never be justiﬁed, and the entire structure of nuclear weapons decision-
making is irrevocably ﬂawed by the essential nature of the proposed action, from top to
bottom (Rosenbaum 2011, 260).
Given that no one can provide credible assurance that the order is consistent with
international law against committing war crimes, the individuals charged with ﬁring
nuclear weapons have limited options.
The ﬁrst is to follow Rosembaum’s advice, with which he concludes his book:
If you’re in a position to launch, whoever you are, now or in the future, if you’re in
a position to send the targeting codes, if it’s up to you, whoever you are, my plea is:
Nothing justiﬁes following orders for genocide. Don’t send those codes, don’t twist those
keys. (Rosenbaum 2011, 260)
The second is, as former US Strategic Commander General Kehler puts it, to trust the
command. Strategic Command, he declares, strives hard to develop nuclear targets and
employment options that are, as he puts it delicately, “mindful” of the laws of armed
conﬂict (Kehler 2016, 59). He advocates using training and personal assurance at every
level of the command to “create trust and conﬁdence in these crew members that legal
issues have been addressed and resolved in advance on their behalf by policy-makers,
commanders, and planners and that the highest legal standards have been enforced,
from target selection to an employment command by the president” (56).
Michael Smidt, staﬀ judge advocate at US Strategic Command until July 2017,
expands on the argument that the Commander always knows best:
Bomber crews, missile crews etc., need to know that every target they may be asked to
engage is being reviewed by legal advisors – not only because that should give them some
p[eace] of mind from a legal jeopardy standpoint, but from a moral one as well. They can
feel conﬁdent if they are asked to do the unthinkable, that others are closely evaluating the
legality of those targets. Of course they know this does not mean they have no responsi-
bility to evaluate the legality of the orders given to them, but you could certainly ask your
questions of pilots every time they are involved in dropping conventional munitions as
well. Nuclear or conventional, crews must consider the law of armed conﬂict, including
during the execution of their mission. Things can change on the ground from the planning
stages, or more intelligence can come to light. Should a pilot being asked to drop
conventional weapons illegally say “no?” Sure. Nuclear weapons? Sure. However, before
a pilot on a nuclear mission should decide that what he or she is being asked to do is
manifestly unlawful, the pilot would have to conclude that their understanding of the facts
and or the law is somehow more accurate and well-reasoned than the President, com-
manders and lawyers that gave a thumbs up to the mission. (Michael Smidt, email to
author, 9 September 2017)
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Smidt admits that it is possible that a crew member might have a better understanding
of the consequences and legal validity of the ﬁre order, albeit unlikely.
At this low, operational level, without the beneﬁt of advice, intelligence information,
details of the target, the individual supposedly should accept a nuclear ﬁre order
without question. In essence, the system operates on trust. Or, as one missileer
explained to Rosenbaum in 1977:
Once you start thinking about all that your head starts going in circles. You got to change
the subject. There’s a point where you gotta stop asking questions and go to work. You’ve
got to have faith that you’re doing the right thing. It all comes down to professionalism.
(Rosenbaum 2011, 61)
The essential problem with a faith-based acceptance of the legitimacy of nuclear ﬁre orders
is that individuals are in fact legally and morally responsible for their actions, and neither
these individuals nor adversaries of a nuclear weapons state can rely on mere trust in such
matters. Indeed, US indoctrination of nuclear weapons personnel includes exposure to the
eﬀects of nuclear strikes to make sure that they are well informed about the eﬀects of
nuclear explosions and to determine if they are psychologically robust enough to ﬁre the
weapons. However, this very educationmeans that no nuclear-certiﬁed individual in theUS
nuclear weapons enterprise can claim ignorance of the likely eﬀects of the weapons as
a defense after they are used. As Hering stated:
We were told that the Launch Oﬃcer had ‘more ﬁrepower under his direct control than all
generals in all wars in the history of warfare.’ I was told that I didn’t have a “need to know”
only to learn later that there were no checks at the Presidential level. (Harold Hering, email
to author, 29 August 2017)
Hering’s simple point – so troubling to the US Air Force – was having been told in the
nuclear personnel induction process of his awesome capability to inﬂict megadeath
once put on duty in a silo, how could he possibly not have a need to know?
Although the precise targets of US nuclear weapons are not public, past targeting
information, the disjuncture between declaratory rhetoric, the reality of targeting over-
kill in US nuclear strategy for most of its history (Miller 2016, location 87 et passim),68
the recognition by multiple recently retired US nuclear commanders that nuclear forces
are unusable, the reality that once started, nuclear wars cannot be limited from
escalating to all-out war, and the sheer numbers of nuclear forces that may be
unleashed in a nuclear attack, are all grounds for an individual to argue that his or
her refusal to ﬁre a nuclear weapon is a legal obligation in almost any conceivable
nuclear war; and that it is incumbent for nuclear commanders to provide concrete,
detailed and persuasive evidence to the contrary.
Acting on individual initiative, and demanding nuclear ﬁre orders that are not just
“mindful” of but demonstrably comply with international law is, as Harold Hering
68As Miller noted, “SAC leadership itself did not understand its own warplan: “As their eyes ﬁrst widened at evidence
they were clearly seeing for the ﬁrst time and then narrowed at the realization that OSD had penetrated so deeply
into their process, it struck me that this meeting could have been titled, ‘Gentlemen, meet your war plan.’” (Miller
2016 at location 358). Miller suggested this overkill originated thusly: “At some point, presumably in the 1970s, the
war planners at the JSTPS (without informing the Joint Staﬀ or OSD, much less the White House staﬀ) had decided to
deﬁne a ‘city’ in such a manner that had the President ordered a strike that included the cities withhold, all of those
cities would nevertheless have been obliterated” (at location 225). Rosenberg, however, suggests the roots are more
fundamental (Rosenberg 1983, 3–71; Richards 2016, 862–978).
JOURNAL FOR PEACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 29
argued, the essence of humanity and of constitutional obligation to not contravene the
laws of war. As he put it, “I have to say I feel I do have a need to know because I am
a human being” (Rosenbaum 2011, 33).69
Armed with only his humanity, Hering adhered to legal principle and was cashiered
from the US Air Force. However, Hering always held open the possibility that his
commanders could provide him with information on checks and balances in the
national nuclear command that demonstrate a basis for trusting nuclear ﬁre orders
and that the orders were sane and defensible and would conform to the law.
The Hering case suggests that the only possible way to overcome the possibility that
nuclear ﬁre orders were almost certainly insane, corrupt, or violative of the laws of war
would be to push real information about targets, damages and military necessity down
the command hierarchy to all individuals involved in delivering nuclear weapons until
such time as nuclear weapons are rendered needless by more capable and less damaging
conventional weapons, nuclear-prone conﬂicts are resolved, and nuclear forces are
reduced, removed or eliminated from force structures.
Conclusion
At this time, there is no authoritative guidance available to individual nuclear weapons
personnel on what they must do to be conﬁdent that the use of nuclear weapons
conforms to the laws of armed conﬂict and other international laws that are now
applicable to the use of nuclear weapons reviewed in the ﬁrst Part of this Article. The
general rules derived from Nuremberg and other trials since then apply to nuclear
weapons (US Department of Defense 2016), but how these apply speciﬁcally to the
decisions and actions of nuclear weaponeers at all levels in nuclear forces has not been
explicated. What, for example, are the boundaries of acting on nuclear ﬁre orders, and
where do these activities begin and end? Do they include all those involved in preparing
nuclear targets and approving them? What about those who communicate the ﬁre
orders to those who deliver the nuclear weapons? Does this accountability include cyber
personnel who protect the transmission of such orders against hackers? What level of
nuclear threat to a state’s existence might justify deterrence threats, and where do these
countervailing threats that constitute mutual nuclear deterrence slip from being legally
justiﬁed forms of self-defense to nuclear aggression, itself a nuclear war crime?
In past decades, individuals like Bordne and Roach acted primarily from an ethical
concern that they not commit war crimes and for other pragmatic and common sense
reasons. They were not driven by their accountability under the evolving corpus of inter-
national law that constitutes the laws of armed conﬂict. (Dunlap 1997, 157–81; Richards
2016, 862–978). That is, these individuals preﬁgured a role for international law in indivi-
dual nuclear combatant’s decisions to follow orders to use nuclear weapons, but did not
establish clear precedents. In neither case were the command hierarchies confronted in
69Here Hering’s assertion that his humanity suﬃces to assert the need to know hearkens back to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which states that everyone has the right “to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (Article 19), that everyone has “duties to the community in
which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible” (Article 29), and all humans “are endowed
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood” (Article 1). G.A. Res 217(A)
at arts. 1, 19, 29 (10 December 1948).
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a manner that forced a fundamental consideration of the issues at stake. In the Okinawa
1962 missile case, the command system auto-corrected quickly and likely suppressed the
incident and nuclear weapons remained in Okinawa until reversion to Japan and local
opposition led to their withdrawal in 1972. In the 1968 Korea ADM case, the command
system simply ignored Roach’s concerns and buried him in an organizational backwater
until he left. Absurdist nuclear war plans and deployments continued in Korea until 1992,
when US nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the peninsula.
Hering was diﬀerent, a true nuclear refusenik whose principled stand set a standard that
confronted the nuclear command with the dilemma of an individual oﬃcer committed to
maintaining the US Constitution, and with it, his obligations to comply with international
law.70 His experience suggests that an international tribunal on nuclear war crimes could
reinforce accountability of nuclear weaponeers at all levels and in all countries in a number
of ways, and thereby reduce the risk that nuclear weapons might be used.
First, nuclear refuseniks may ﬁnd some legal and political protection for their actions
if an international tribunal (or tribunals if they were set up initially at a regional level)
issued legal rulings on what constitutes nuclear war crimes. An international tribunal
might provide legal guidance on what constitutes minimum information on targeting,
collateral damage, etc., that must be provided to all nuclear weapons personnel in
advance of nuclear war operations. In addition, an international tribunal might clarify
what types of threats constitute nuclear aggression, and what, if any, do not.
Second, an international tribunal might provide legal justiﬁcation for non-nuclear
weapons states providing sanctuary to those who reject nuclear ﬁre orders on the
ground that such orders are most likely manifestly illegal. This sanctuary might
encourage nuclear refuseniks to push back against nuclear ﬁre orders or other actions
that constitute nuclear aggression.
Third, an international tribunal might send a message that nuclear war criminals at all
levels, but especially the political and military leaders who decide to use nuclear weapons
and issue orders to do so, will be held accountable. No one can know before a nuclear war
whether such an international tribunal would have the reach to arrest and try such nuclear
war criminals;, but if they are not direct targets, theymay well be the most capable states left
standing. The prospect that there is nowhere to retreat from a smoking, radiating ruin
without facing arrest might bring pause to even the most rabid nuclear commander. And,
because nuclear weapons states that are members of the UN Security Council can veto
referrals to the ICC for nuclear war crimes, both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states
should favor such a tribunal – because it would close the veto loophole and ensure that all
their adversaries would have greater accountability than they do today.
Fourth, an international tribunal that encourages nuclear refuseniks might reinforce
the ability of senior military and civilian leaders to disobey illegal nuclear ﬁre orders
from those who make such decisions, whether it is a sole commander as in the United
States and the DPRK, or a group command decision, as may be the case in China where
the Central Military Commission appears to control the nuclear trigger.
70We recognize that these three cases are all American, and there are likely similar cases in the other nuclear weapons
states that call for similar analysis. Also, we are aware that other cases of false orders being received have occurred in
US nuclear command history. Each incident also may have its own extraordinary individual whose stories of refusing
to act on such orders have yet to be told. We have no doubt that more such stories will surface with time.
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The fact that a senior commander rejects an order as illegal, as General Kehler
preﬁgured could occur, might become a more substantial barrier to circumvention of
this disobeyal by the top commander if his refusal to transmit the order is known to his
subordinates, and the subordinates knew that they are individually accountable for their
own decisions if directed by the nuclear commander to ﬁre their weapons and that their
highest duty would be to not commit nuclear war crimes, as an expectation of the
nuclear command itself – in the same way that killing babies and massacring civilians is
also held repulsive to professional military values.
Fifth, the international tribunal might also address the contrary argument that
encouraging nuclear weapons personnel to disobey nuclear ﬁre orders reduces the
credibility of nuclear deterrence, thereby inviting nuclear threats and attacks, and
increasing the risk of inadvertent or purposeful nuclear war. Hering already pointed
out that the credibility of legally justiﬁed nuclear threats would likely be increased, not
decreased, by informing nuclear weapons personnel of the requisite information to
determine if their acting on nuclear ﬁre orders is legal.
In retrospect, it seems to me our deterrence would be more credible if those charged with
the awesome responsibility of launching nukes would, as human beings with consciences,
had the information to remove any doubt now instead of wrestling with the issue when an
order came down. (Harold Hering, email to author, 29 August 2017)
In conclusion, it is noteworthy that the ﬁrst time that nuclear weapons were used, on
the inhabitants of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, those who delivered the bomb had
almost zero comprehension of the act that they were about to commit. Afterward, one
of those involved, Claude Eatherly, who piloted the weather plane that cleared the way
for the Enola Gay to drop its nuclear bomb on Hiroshima, was crippled mentally by his
guilt and post-attack remorse and attempted suicide on more than one occasion
(Eatherly and Anders 1961). He was clear that if he had understood what he was
about to do, he would have refused.
In reality, not much has changed for those who are charged with ﬁring nuclear
weapons today. An international tribunal might not only avoid more Eatherlies; it
might help avoid more Hiroshimas, and make Nagasaki the last civilian population to
be annihilated with nuclear weapons.
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